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Using enterprise data for the economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the CIS, this study examines 
the effects of corruption on productivity. Corruption 
is narrowly defined as the occurrence of informal 
payments to government officials to ease the day-to-
day operation of firms. The effects of this “bribe tax” 
on productivity are compared to the consequences of 
red tape, which may be understood as imposing a “time 
tax” on firms. When testing effects in the full sample, 
only the bribe tax appears to have a negative impact on 
firm-level productivity, while the effect of the time tax 
is insignificant. At the same time, unlike similar studies 
using country-level data, firm level analysis allows a direct 
test of the “efficient grease” hypothesis by investigating 
This paper is a product of the Private and Financial Sector Department, Europe and Central Asia Region. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dderosa@
worldbank.org.  
whether corruption may increase productivity by helping 
reduce the time tax on firms. Results provide no evidence 
of a trade-off between the time and the bribe taxes, 
implying that bribing does not emerge as a second-
best option to achieve higher productivity by helping 
circumvent cumbersome bureaucratic requirements. 
When controlling for EU membership the effects of the 
bribe tax are more harmful in non-EU countries. This 
suggests that the surrounding environment influences the 
way in which firm behaviour affects firm performance. 
In particular, in countries where corruption is more 
prevalent and the legal framework is weaker, bribery is 
more harmful for firm-level productivity.Corruption and Productivity 
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One of the most obvious facts about corruption is that poor countries tend to be the most corrupt. 
Available data at the country level support this view. For instance, there is a 0.81 correlation 
between GDP per capita and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, one of 
the most commonly used measures of corruption. 
 
Beyond this simple observation, understanding corruption is not an easy task. For instance, it is 
debatable whether corruption is a cause of low incomes per capita, one of its consequences or, as 
it seems more likely, whether the relationship between corruption and income is an intricate one, 
made of a web of dynamic interactions, whereby some countries appear trapped in a condition of 
low incomes and high corruption.  
 
An even more daunting task is to find a cure for corruption, since historical experience does not 
provide many obvious examples of countries that have been successful in eradicating it. 
Corruption may be endemic and linked to deep-rooted cultural or “institutional” features of a 
society, which are not easily overturned by specific policy measures. For example, increasing the 
wage of public officials may prove ineffective in the absence of credible mechanisms to sanction 
deviant behaviour. Furthermore, it is difficult to identify a reservation wage for public officials, 
beyond which their incentive to accept or demand bribes is reduced. From the point of view of 
researchers and policymakers, this is so because corruption is not easily measured or quantified. 
The first challenge, then, is to delimit the field of investigation by providing a working definition 
of corruption and to find adequate sources of information that allow quantifying its extent.  
 
In common parlance and in academic research corruption can take many forms. Most often it is 
understood as bribery, whereby an official demands informal payments to perform an official 
task - e.g. issuing a license - or to circumvent laws and regulations. State capture may also 
qualify for the definition of corruption, when bureaucrats subject themselves to more or less 
legal forms of lobbying, involving monetary bribes or other forms of exchange of favours, to 
afford preferential treatment to certain private interests. Political patronage,  nepotism and 3 
 
cronyism, whether or not they involve monetary kickbacks, may also be included in a broad 
definition of corruption. 
 
For our purposes, and to demarcate the field of investigation, corruption is defined as a “bribe 
tax”, a certain amount of money necessary to enforce a contract between an individual and the 
state. In this asymmetrical relationship, the state – or its agents - define the property rights of 
individuals and enforce them with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The institutions 
that govern this type of “vertical” transactions between the state and its citizens are defined by 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) as property rights institutions and are distinguished from 
contracting institutions that regulate “horizontal” transactions among ordinary citizens. Property 
rights institutions are inefficient when they allow those who control the state to extract rents 
from producers (Acemoglu, 2006) and the extortion of bribes from firms may be viewed as a 
form of rent extraction perpetrated by bureaucrats (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  
 
Another important task is to identify a suitable data source to quantify the extent of corruption. A 
first type of data is based on expert assessments, such as the International Country Risk Guide. A 
second type takes the form of a meta-database, assembling the results of a number of perception-
based surveys. Popular indicators in this group include the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
estimated by Transparency International or the indicator for Control of Corruption included in 
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. All these assessments present a high degree of 
correlation, indicating that they concur in identifying levels of corruption across countries and 
are, therefore, virtually interchangeable for the purpose of cross-country econometric analysis. A 
third source of measurement of corruption is provided by enterprise surveys, which have the 
benefit of allowing to link the occurrence and effects of corruption to a number of firm-level and 
country characteristics. 
 
Our analysis intends to exploit the advantages of the latter type of data by using the information 
contained in the 2009 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) of 
over 11,000 firms in 28 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The sample of 
countries is very diverse. It covers all the formerly communist countries of Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union, which have undergone the profound institutional transformation connected 4 
 
with transition to a market economy. The group of formerly communist countries presents 
substantial variation, ranging from the low income economies of Central Asia, to high income 
Central European countries, which, as members of the EU, tend to have a fully developed market 
system.  
 
The objective of this study is to shed light on the consequences of corruption for economic 
performance. Unlike similar country level studies using broad definitions of corruption and 
institutional quality combined with aggregate measures of economic performance, investigation 
of the effects of bribery on firm level productivity will allow to be more precise regarding the 
incentives of economic agents to engage in corrupt behaviour and the consequences this has for 
productive efficiency. Variables for firm level bribery and productivity can be obtained from the 
BEEPS database, which, in addition to information on the occurrence of bribing and other 
aspects of firm operation and performance, allows estimating a measure of total factor 
productivity (TFP) at the enterprise level. 
 
The need to recur to bribery is often linked to the power of government officials to impose and 
enforce regulatory requirements on individuals and firms and to exact bribes in the process (see, 
for example, Djankov et al. 2002). In order to account for this possibility, it is necessary to 
identify some measure of the power that officials have over firms as enforcers of regulatory 
requirements. The BEEPS survey offers such a measure at the firm level. It refers to the time that 
enterprise managers are required to spend complying with government regulations, amounting to 
a time tax imposed on firms. This may be interpreted as an opportunity cost borne by firms, 
which, in isolation or in combination with the bribe tax, potentially constitutes a drag on 
enterprise performance. The availability of a firm level measure for the time spent dealing with 
bureaucracy offers the opportunity to perform a direct test of the so-called “efficient grease” 
hypothesis, which is explicitly defined in the literature in terms of bribery helping reduce the 
time required for some interaction between an economic agent and the state, as in Lui’s (1985) 
queuing model.
1  
                                                 
1 Use of the time tax as a specific outcome of the institutional inefficiencies linked with corruption distinguishes our 
paper from other studies, such as Méon and Sekkat (2005) and Méon and Weill (2008). These authors, for lack of 
more precise country level data explicitly reflecting the time involved in interactions with the state, use generic 
country level proxies of “governance” to test whether corruption does indeed act as efficient grease. 5 
 
The effects of corruption on productivity are modelled based on a firm level production 
function.
2 This paper offers a number of novelties with the respect to the existing literature on 
the consequences of corruption. First, the time spent dealing with bureaucracy, which is 
intimately linked to bribe payments, is directly examined. Second, the analysis makes use of 
cross-country firm level data in order to investigate the effects of country-level characteristics in 
mitigating the negative productivity impact of bribe payments. Third, we deal with the potential 
endogeneity of corruption at the firm level using an instrumental variables approach.  To do so, 
we make use of the rich firm level data we have available in the BEEPS data to come up with 
reasonable instruments.   
 
Results of econometric analysis highlight some differences between the effects of corruption per 
se and those of the time tax. Across the entire sample, whereas the time devoted to complying 
with government regulations has no significant effect on firm level productivity, corruption has a 
statistically significant negative effect in instrumental variable specifications. Additionally, 
regression results show no evidence in favour of the “efficient grease” hypothesis, whereby 
bribing would be a second best option to achieve higher productivity levels by helping firms 
circumvent burdensome regulatory requirements. Namely, when bribing is made conditional on 
the time spent dealing with government regulations, the interaction term has no significant effect 
on productivity, implying that no trade-off emerges between the time and the bribe tax. 
 
When controlling for the diversity of the sample distinguishing between recent EU members 
from Central and Eastern Europe and non-EU countries, the negative impact of the bribe tax on 
productivity is higher in non-EU countries. Observing that levels of institutional quality are 
generally higher in EU countries, this may suggest that the effects of corrupt behaviour on firm 
performance vary depending on broader country characteristics.  
 
In order to test this environmental effect, bribery experienced by individual firms is made 
conditional on broader country characteristics that may play a role in influencing individual 
                                                 
2 Fisman and Svensson (2007) look at the relationship between corruption and firm growth using firm level data for 
Uganda.  Our paper is different in a number of aspects.  First, we use firm level data for a number of countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which allows us to explore cross country heterogeneity. This is 
important, as we show, since we find strong differences in the relationship between corruption and productivity in 
different countries.  Second, we look at productivity, not growth of sales as in Fisman and Svensson (2007).  . 6 
 
choices to engage in corrupt behaviour. The first measure used is the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which provides an independent measurement of perceived 
corruption in 180 countries, based on 13 different expert and business surveys. Inclusion of 
country-wide corruption may be interpreted to reflect the extent to which peer effects may be 
conducive to corrupt behaviour, as in theoretical models that explain the persistence of 
corruption with social effects, such as Andvig and Moene (1990) and Tirole (1996). The second 
country-wide measure, used to probe the robustness of the environmental effect of corruption, is 
the World Economic Forum (WEF) index of the effectiveness of the legal framework in 
resolving disputes, intended to capture the possibility that a higher likelihood of sanctioning by 
the legal system may act as a deterrent.
3 
 
Regression analysis shows that firms that do not pay bribes in environments with a high 
prevalence of corruption and inefficient legal frameworks experience higher productivity. 
Furthermore, when overall levels of corruption exceed a certain threshold, the total effect of 
corruption on productivity - i.e. the combination of individual and country effects - is 
increasingly negative. This indicates that, whereas environmental circumstances are beyond the 
choice set of individual firms, managers still have some degree of autonomy in deciding whether 
to recur to bribery or not and this affects firm level productivity. 
 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. The following section provides an overview 
of the relevant literature on the possible causes of corruption and on its effects on economic 
performance. Next is a description of the BEEPS 2009 data, as well as an exposition of the 
econometric methodology. The fourth section demonstrates the effects of corruption on 
productivity, both unconditional and conditional on the time tax experienced by individual firms 
and on country characteristics in terms of prevalence of corruption and efficiency of the legal 
framework. The final section concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
3 North (1990) distinguishes between “informal norms,” “formal rules” and “enforcement” as pillars of the 
institutional framework of an economy. For our purposes, the CPI might also be viewed as a proxy of informal 
norms of behaviour dictated by social networks, while the WEF index of the efficiency of the legal framework might 
be interpreted as a proxy for the quality of formal rules or their enforcement.  7 
 
2. Causes and Consequences of Corruption 
 
The occurrence of corruption can be directly linked to the quality of the overall institutional 
environment, which, in turn, is seen by several authors as the fundamental ingredient of 
economic development. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) focus on the 
persistence of inherited institutions, by maintaining that the disease environment determined 
different settlement patterns of European colonists, which, in turn, shaped subsequent 
institutions. Notably, where Europeans settled in large numbers they established solid “property 
rights” - as opposed to “extractive” - institutions aimed at benefiting residents of the colony, 
resulting in higher institutional quality and lower incidence of corruption today. In a similar 
spirit, other theories stress legal origin (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998 
and 1999) as the source of institutional inefficiencies. According to this view, corruption is more 
likely to be observed in countries based on civil law systems, due to their greater tendency to 
regulate economic activity, which provides more frequent opportunities for corrupt behaviour.  
 
Given the strong empirical association between various measures of institutional quality, 
including corruption, and incomes per capita, it is plausible to assume that institutions in general 
-  and the extent of corruption in particular -  develop in response to a country’s income level and 
to the differential needs associated with various stages of development (Lipset, 1960). In this 
spirit, better institutional outcomes would emerge when, in response to economic development, 
the benefits of internalizing higher income opportunities -  for instance by keeping corruption 
under control -  exceed the transaction costs of doing so (Demsetz, 1967).  
 
Institutional outcomes, including corruption, and levels of income per capita may crucially 
depend on the accumulated stock of human capital (Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 2004). The central role of human capital becomes evident when considering that formal 
institutions - e.g. courts - require a high level of competence to effectively perform their 
function. Furthermore, together with a free press (Besley and Burgess, 2001; Brunetti and 
Weder, 2001), widespread literacy is a precondition for the population to be able to scrutinize 
government activity and prevent abuses.  
 8 
 
Another possibility is that economic growth itself, rather than income levels, could play a role in 
determining the occurrence of corruption. For instance, a growing economy would have more 
resources available to keep corruption under control, thus generating better institutional 
outcomes and reducing observed levels corruption (Paldam, 2002). At the same time, economic 
growth can reduce corruption because corrupt elites have an interest in collecting bribes from a 
growing pie. This implies that, at least in the short term, they have to ensure that institutions are 
sufficiently immune to corruption to allow incomes to increase (Aidt and Dutta, 2008). 
 
Policies aimed at increasing competition in product markets may be instrumental in reducing 
corruption, since competitive pressures leading to a reduction in mark-ups and profits of firms 
may limit the resources available to pay bribes. In support of this view, Ades and di Tella (1999) 
find that corruption levels are higher in countries where domestic firms are sheltered from 
foreign competition by the existence of barriers to trade, while economies dominated by a small 
number of firms, or with ineffective antitrust regulations, experience higher degrees of 
corruption.  
 
More generally, a regulatory environment that stifles market entry and competition is likely to 
increase opportunities for corruption. More stringent regulatory requirements pander to the 
discretionary power of regulators and enforcers to collect bribes from producers, thus increasing 
the prevalence of corruption (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002). Such a 
view is in line with public choice theories, whereby regulation is pursued for the benefit of 
politicians and bureaucrats to create rents and extract them through political patronage or bribery 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1998). Rent extraction on the part of bureaucrats and politicians is 
inefficient because regulators are disorganized and their actions discretionary. As a consequence, 
more restrictive regulation may result in a “time tax” on entrepreneurs, which diverts 
entrepreneurial time and talent away from productive activities, with negative consequences for 
economic performance. 
 
A separate strand of the literature highlights the importance of social (or peer) effects in 
determining individual incentives for corruption and its persistence. Andvig and Moene (1990) 
model a situation where the individual propensity for corruption increases when corruption is 9 
 
more pervasive, since, in this situation, it is easier to find corrupt officials and escape 
punishment. Tirole (1996) provides a rationale for the persistence of corruption. In his model 
members of a group with a bad reputation (i.e. corrupt individuals) have less of an incentive to 
behave honestly since individual behaviour is imperfectly observed and individual reputation 
partly depends on group reputation. 
 
 
2.1 Corruption as “Efficient Grease” 
 
Corruption is sometimes seen a second-best option when it helps reduce the time involved in 
dealing with burdensome regulatory requirements. According to the proponents of this “efficient 
grease” hypothesis this would happen because, in spite of the transaction costs it entails, bribery 
would lead to lower effective red tape for the firm. A theoretical framework for this efficiency 
enhancing role of corruption is provided by Lui’s (1985) queuing model, where the size of bribes 
by different economic agents reflects their different opportunity cost, with more efficient agents 
more able or willing to buy lower effective red tape, reflected in a lower “time tax”. As a 
consequence, a license or contract awarded on the basis of bribe size could achieve Pareto-
optimal allocation. Kaufmann and Wei (1999) identify a major shortcoming in Lui’s (1985) 
assumptions, namely that the regulatory burden is treated as exogenous, independent of the 
incentives for officials to take bribes. This may not be the case since the incentives of 
bureaucrats can be modified by specific policy measures. Ultimately, because of this assumption, 
Lui’s theory is partial equilibrium in nature, and may not hold in a general equilibrium.  
 
More generally, Bardhan (1997) argues that red tape and corruption are not exogenous, as they 
are caused - or at least preserved or aggravated - by those who benefit from an overregulated and 
corrupt system. Hence, as argued by Aidt and Dutta (2008), even if corruption helps overcome 
cumbersome regulation in the short term, it creates incentives to create more such regulation in 
the long term. Empirical evidence, especially at the micro level, is generally not supportive of the 
efficient grease hypothesis
4, with corruption found to increase the time spent by managers 
                                                 
4 One of few exceptions is Egger and Winner (2005) who, based on country-level evidence, argue that corruption 
can help overcome regulatory obstacles and stimulate FDI, 10 
 





2.2 Corruption and Economic Performance 
 
If corruption was a means to “greasing the wheels of commerce” it could possibly have positive 
effects on economic performance by reducing transaction costs in the vertical transactions 
between the state and its citizens. However, the theoretical and empirical evidence in favour of 
the opposite argument appears more convincing, highlighting the negative consequences of 
corruption for resource allocation, entrepreneurship, investment and innovation.
6  
 
The main argument is that the prevalence of corruption may distort resource allocation by 
increasing the returns to rent-seeking compared to those of productive activities (Baumol, 1990). 
An extremely corrupt environment may induce individuals to minimize interaction with the state 
by expanding more slowly, operating in the informal sector or even forgoing entrepreneurial 
activity altogether. Corroborating this point, Djankov et al. (2002) find that entry of new firms is 
more difficult in the presence of greater corruption and larger unofficial economies.  
 
Corruption also affects the allocation of entrepreneurial talent, when, in highly corrupt 
environments, entrepreneurs may devote greater efforts to obtaining valuable licenses and 
preferential market access than to improving productivity (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). 
When entrepreneurial talent is directed towards productive activity, the rate of innovation and 
investment is likely to increase with positive consequences for productivity and income growth. 
In contrast, when talent is directed towards rent extraction, returns to talent are maximized by 
appropriating wealth rather than wealth creation (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991, 1993; 
Acemoglu and Verdier 1998). 
 
                                                 
5 Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) also find a negative correlation between bribe payments and sales, although 
these authors do not instrument for bribe payments. 
6 For an overview of the consequences of corruption, see Lambsdorff (2003), Svensonn (2005), Krueger (1974), 
Rose-Ackerman (1975 and 1999) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993 and 1998). 11 
 
The sources of productivity enhancements, technological progress and investment, may be 
directly affected in corrupt environments. For instance, entrepreneurs may have incentives to 
adopt inefficient “fly-by-night” technologies of production with an inefficiently high degree of 
reversibility, which allows them to react more flexibly to future demands from corrupt 
officials—and more credibly threaten to shut down operations (Svensson, 2003). Additionally, 
vested interests may directly oppose the adoption of new technologies, which would threaten 
their position of influence by rendering obsolete the older technological vintages they control 
(Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1996). Finally, corruption may erect de facto entry barriers into 
otherwise competitive markets with discouraging effects for investment decisions, in a 
mechanism similar to the one proposed by Alesina et al. (2005). Alternatively, the monetary cost 
involved in the payment of bribes may simply limit the amount of resources available to expand 
productive capacity via investment.  
 
In addition to distortionary allocation effects, the discretionary power of state officials will 
increase the risk of expropriation thus reducing the appropriability of returns to investment and 
innovation (Demsetz, 1967 and Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). This will further diminish rewards 
for entrepreneurial behaviour, while propping up inefficient firms engaged in corrupt practices. 
In this spirit, Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002), using firm-level data from former 
communist countries in Europe, find a negative effect of paying bribes on investment and 
interpret this finding as the effect of insecure property rights.  
 
Whereas corruption can impact economic performance through all these channels, its adverse 
effects may be non-linear and depend on the overall level of institutional quality (or governance) 
in the country. Two studies – both based on country level data - find such non-linearities in the 
relationship between corruption and growth, namely a more negative effect when institutional 
quality is poor. Méon and Sekkat (2005), based on sample of 71 countries between 1970 and 
1998 and using various proxies for both corruption and governance,
7 find that corruption is most 
harmful to growth where governance is weak. Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) examine country-
                                                 
7 The authors use the Transparency International CPI, as well as a number of indicators from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators, as proxies for corruption and governance. 12 
 
level evidence by using different proxies for corruption
8, as well as the Freedom House index of 
political freedom as a proxy for overall institutional quality. They find that the relationship 
between corruption and growth is non-monotonic with corruption having negative effects only at 
high levels of incidence.  
 
 
3 Data and Methodology 
 
To assess the effects of corruption on firm performance this paper uses the 2009 EBRD/World 
Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
 of over 11,000 firms 
in 28 transition and developed countries.
9  The BEEPS was specifically conceived to assess the 
extent to which government policies and practices facilitate or impede business activity. It 
therefore provides a vast array of information on the behaviour and performance of firms, which 
allows to explicitly model the possible influence of various firm characteristics on the occurrence 
and impact of corruption at the firm level. 
 
Table 1 lists the countries included in the sample.  It shows that there is substantial variation in 
terms of income group (based on the World Bank classification for 2008)
10 and EU membership.  
Such high dispersion in income per capita provides a particularly rich sample, that allows 
controlling for specific country characteristics linked to the level of development and, in 
particular, to the quality of the institutional environment.  The business environment is examined 
by asking firms to assess how various factors affect business operations, including infrastructure, 
financial services, government regulation, tax administration, judiciary functions.  Corruption is 
also examined, allowing us to model its occurrence and impact on the operation and performance 
                                                 
8 The authors use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the IMD index of corruption is published by the 
Institute for Management Development (IMD) and the corruption perceptions index (CPI) compiled by 
Transparency International. 
9 Previous rounds of the BEEPS surveys were carried out in 1999, 2002 and 2005.  Unfortunately, given the changes 
in survey design, a meaningful link between the 2009 and earlier versions is not feasible.  Also, the survey nature of 
the data leads to the loss of many observations in multivariate regressions, owing to non-response rates. 
10 Economies are divided according to 2008 GNI per capita. The groups are: low income, $975 or less; lower middle 
income, $976 - $3,855;  upper middle income, $3,856 - $11,905; and  high income, $11,906 or more.  See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:641331
56~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (accessed 15 October 2009). 13 
 
of firms.  A list of variables used and their description is given in Table A.1, and their descriptive 
statistics are in given in Table A.2 in the appendix. 
 
Table 1 List of countries in the sample 
Economy  Income group  EU member 
Croatia High  income    
Estonia High  income  
Slovenia High  income  
Czech Republic  High income  
Hungary High  income  
Slovak Republic  High income  
Belarus  Upper middle income    
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Upper middle income    
Bulgaria  Upper middle income  
Kazakhstan  Upper middle income    
Latvia  Upper middle income  
Lithuania  Upper middle income  
Macedonia, FYR  Upper middle income    
Montenegro  Upper middle income    
Poland  Upper middle income  
Romania  Upper middle income  
Russian Federation  Upper middle income    
Serbia  Upper middle income    
Turkey  Upper middle income    
Albania  Lower middle income    
Armenia  Lower middle income    
Azerbaijan  Lower middle income    
Georgia  Lower middle income    
Moldova  Lower middle income    
Ukraine  Lower middle income    
Kyrgyz Republic  Low income    
Tajikistan Low  income    
Uzbekistan Low  income    
Source: World Bank.   
 
A typical concern when using survey data is that of individual perception bias (Kaufman and 
Wei, 1999).  Some firms may, for instance, consistently provide positive or negative answers 
depending on their overall perception of the business climate. In principle, assuming that the bias 
is uncorrelated across groups of respondents, individual perception bias contributes only to the 
standard error of estimates obtained from the survey responses. In cross-country surveys, such as 
the BEEPS, the group within which the bias is likely to be correlated is the particular country in 
which respondents operate. Perception bias at the country level could originate from different 
cultural norms and degrees of political freedom across countries, which may influence the choice 14 
 
of specific ratings and the willingness of business people to criticise state institutions. Fries et al. 
(2003) check for such perception bias in the BEEPS 2002 by statistically comparing measures 
obtained from the aggregation of survey responses to related objective measures and find no 
significant perception biases across the countries in the sample.  Since the BEEPS 2009 follows a 
similar methodology, we may be reasonably confident that perception bias will not affect the 
results of the analysis. However, as a further control, the analysis that follows will make use of 
sector and country level fixed effects. 
 
 
3.1 The Bribe Tax and Productivity 
 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the extent to which institutional inefficiencies experienced by 
firms –namely corrupt practices - may be a drag on their productivity. At the micro level, there 
are a number of reasons for expecting negative consequences of corruption for productivity.  
Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, corruption distorts the allocation of scarce resources 
away from the most productive use.  This, all other things equal, should have a negative effect on 
productivity.  Secondly, corruption may decrease firms incentives - or increase costs - of 
expanding productive capacity or investment (as in Alesina et al., 2005), which, again, would 
have a negative impact on productivity.  On the other hand, as foreseen in the “efficient grease” 
hypothesis previously discussed, corruption may help a firm to cut through red tape and hence 
increase productivity. At the same time, both the occurrence and the effects of corrupt behaviour 
for individual firms may be linked to the quality of the institutional environment in the country. 
In this sense, a crucial role may be played by the degree to which corruption is a widely recurrent 
and accepted phenomenon, as well as by the ability of legal structures, such as courts or 
administrative recourse mechanisms within the public administration, to enforce contracts 
between individuals and the state and sanction deviant practices. 
 
In order to capture the complexity of the phenomenon of corruption and its potentially varied 
effects on the performance of individual firms, the empirical methodology will proceed in three 
steps. First, is an analysis of the effects of the bribe tax and of the time tax on individual firms, 
controlling for firm, sector and country characteristics that may influence both phenomena. 15 
 
Second, we proceed with an explicit test of the “efficient grease” hypothesis. Possible trade-offs 
between  time consuming compliance with government regulation and the payment of bribes are 
modelled by including an interaction term between the time and the bribe tax and observing its 
effects on firm level productivity. Finally, the effect of individual corrupt conduct on firm level 
productivity is made conditional on the level of institutional quality in the country. That is, in 
addition to country fixed effects, the econometric specification includes an interaction term 
between the firm level bribe tax and independent assessments of the prevalence of corruption or 
the quality of the legal framework in the country.   
 
We model the effect of corruption on TFP using an augmented production function, including, in 
addition to factor inputs, the set of firm, industry and country characteristics that are assumed to 
have an effect on output.  Hence, we include corruption explicitly in the determination of output, 
as in (1): 
 




ijc + α3Lijc + α4Mijc + 
+ βcorruptionijc + γXijc + dj + dc + εijc     ( 1 )  
 
where yijc is log output by firm i in industry j and country c and K
land, K
equipment, L and M are log 
of land, machinery, employment and materials, respectively.
11 
 
The main variable of interest is corruptionijc, which is the measure of corruption at the firm level. 
It is defined as a “bribe tax”, in the form of a dummy equal to one if a firm replies “frequently”, 
“usually” or “always” to the question “is it common to have to pay some irregular additional 
payment or gifts to get things done with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, 
etc.” The same specification can be used to test the direct effects of the “time tax”, defined as the 
percentage of senior management time devoted to dealing with bureaucratic requirements, by 
including it in the model as a substitute for the “bribe tax”. Consideration of both variables 
allows verifying the extent to which the time and the bribe tax are different phenomena, with 
                                                 
11 Estimation of TFP at the firm level is, of course, a task fraught with methodological difficulties. Prime among 
these is the simultaneity problem in the estimation of factor inputs, which are likely to be endogenously determined 
with output (see, for example, Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). However, due to the cross section nature of our data we 
are not able to implement an approach a la Levinsohn and Petrin. This should be borne in mind in the interpretation 
of our empirical results.  16 
 
different implications for firm productivity. It should be noted that the overall effect of bribes on 
productivity might be underestimated due to selection bias, as firms that had to pay the largest 
bribes may have been driven out of business altogether and, therefore, they are not in the dataset.  
 
Xijc is a vector of control variables that serve to detect observable aspects of firm heterogeneity 
in our data to allow identification of the effect of the bribe tax on productivity. It consists of 
sizeM, sizeL, age, exporter, innovator and foreign-owned.  SizeM and sizeL are dummy variables 
representing medium and large firms, respectively.  Larger firms are expected to have higher 
productivity due to the effects of scale economies. The variable age represents the age of firms in 
2008, capturing effects such as the vintage of the firm or learning by doing externalities on TFP.   
 
Innovator, exporter, and foreign-owned are all dummy variables indicating whether the firm is 
engaged in innovation (in terms of having positive R&D expenditure), involved in exports and 
owned by foreign investors.  These variables are expected to have a positive effect on 
productivity. In particular, innovation and R&D expenditures tend to positively affect firm 
productivity since they lead to the development of more efficient production technologies or to 
the more effective adoption of technologies developed outside the firm (Aw, Roberts and Xu, 
2008).
12 At the same time, exporting activity has been found in several empirical studies to be 
positively associated with firm-level productivity.
13 FDI, on its part, is associated with various 
measures of firm performance, including investment, innovation and productivity, since foreign 
owners can be expected to transfer technology and know-how to domestic affiliates (see, for 
example, Girma and Görg, 2007).
14  
 
In order to account for the possibility that increased competition may act as a form of control on 
corruption, while, at the same time, affecting firm level productivity, Xijc also includes a variable 
for the perceived intensity of competition. The variable is defined “How much of an obstacle are 
competitors to your operations?”. Specifically, firms are asked to rank whether competition is an 
                                                 
12 Klette and Kortum (2004) provide a rationale for the effects of firm-level innovation on aggregate technological 
change and growth. 
13 Wagner (2007) offers an overview of the vast empirical evidence on the strong association between exporting and 
productivity. 
14 Hoekman and Smarzynska Javorcik (2006) present a number of instances of the interaction between innovation, 
trade and FDI. In particular, they show that the innovation activity associated with the technology transfer occurring 
with FDI and trade results in sizeable productivity gains at the firm level.  17 
 
obstacle on a scale from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle).  We define our variable as 
the difference between the individual firm’s response and the country average.  As mentioned 
earlier, the rationale for including the competition variable is that, as firms’ profits are driven 
down by competitive pressure, there are no excess profits from which to pay bribes (Ades and Di 
Tella, 1999). 
 
Xijc also includes two measures of the firm’s perception of the quality of the institutional 
environment.  The first is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm responds that the quality of 
courts is a major or very severe obstacle to operating a business.  The second is a dummy 
variable that is similarly defined if a firm sees political instability as a severe problem.  Including 
these two measures allows us to capture some aspects of institutional quality that may be 
correlated with corruption and, if not controlled for, may therefore bias our results.   
 
Finally, dj and dc include a full set of industry and country dummies, respectively, and uijc is the 
idiosyncratic error term, which allows for clustering at the country-industry level. 
 
 
3.2 Efficient grease: Trade-offs between the Bribe Tax and the Time Tax 
 
The model in equation (1) can be expanded to verify the extent to which bribes may be a second 
best outcome in a context where inefficient bureaucracy leads to a time tax for producers. In 
other words, when regulation is overly restrictive, corruption may aide entrepreneurs in their 
interaction with the state, thus leading to a beneficial impact on productivity. A direct way to test 
this hypothesis would be to include the bribe tax and the time tax jointly in the empirical 
specification, together with their interaction. The latter would test the extent to which the effect 
of bribes on productivity is conditional on time consuming dealings with bureaucracy; in other 
words, it would allow a direct test of the efficient grease hypothesis, as in equation (2): 
 




ijc + α3Lijc + α4Mijc + β1corruptionijc + β2timetaxijc + 
+β3(corruptionijc* timetaxijc) + γXijc + dj + dc + εijc     ( 2 )  
 18 
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      ( 3 )  
 
In equation (3) a significant coefficient for β3 will indicate that the effect of corruption on 
productivity depends on the degree to which the firm is engaged in time consuming relations 
with the state. In particular, a positive coefficient for β3 would indicate that a high time tax is 
accompanied with less negative - or even positive - effects of corruption on productivity, thus 
providing evidence in favour of “efficient grease”, with corruption helping to mitigate the effects 
of burdensome regulation. The same result could also be consistent with a setting where bribe-
revenue maximizing bureaucrats may use red tape (the time tax) as a screening device to give 
production licenses to high-productivity firms (Banerjee, 1997).  In such a model, every firm 
pays the same amount of bribes while high productivity firms spend more time with bureaucrats.  
 
 
3.3 Institutional Quality: Interaction between Firm-level and Country-level Effects 
 
As a further step in our analysis, in order to check whether the effect of corruption on firm level 
productivity differs depending on country characteristics, we extend equation (1) and interact 
corruption with country level measures of institutional quality that may be hypothesized to be 
relevant in determining individual incentives for corrupt behaviour.  For this we use two 
alternative indicators.  First is the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) for the year 2008, which allows investigating whether the prevalence of corruption at the 
country level has implications for firm behaviour and, consequently, productivity performance. 
The CPI captures the perceived levels of public-sector corruption in a given country and is a 
composite index, drawing on different expert and business surveys. It may be interpreted to 
reflect the possibility of social effects as described earlier, whereby in a more corrupt 
environment individual entrepreneurs would have stronger incentives to behave corruptly. The 
CPI ranges from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (highly clean).  It varies across countries and is 
fixed across sectors for a given country. 19 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the average levels of productivity, bribe tax and CPI are different 
between low CPI and high CPI countries
15 and between EU and non-EU countries.  These 
variations could imply that the impact of bribe tax on productivity could be different for high and 
low CPI countries as suggested by equation (5), as well as for EU and non-EU countries.  No 
major differences can be depicted in the level of time tax, however.
16   
Table 2 Summary statistics by group of countries 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
TFP 0.148 0.916 0.150 0.941 0.144 0.874 0.239 0.983 0.090 0.867
Bribe Tax 0.099 0.298 0.139 0.346 0.030 0.171 0.195 0.396 0.030 0.169
Time Tax 14.528 18.223 14.313 19.819 14.884 15.220 14.669 21.172 14.430 15.851
CPI 3.393 1.150 2.863 0.904 4.288 0.949 2.287 0.362 4.191 0.814
Non EU EU Total CPI CPI  CPI CPI 
 
Note: TFP is calculated as a residual from a simple production function, see appendix 
 
As a robustness check, we also use an alternative measure of institutional quality, namely the 
World Economic Forum’s index of the effectiveness of the legal framework is solving legal 
disputes, which can be interpreted as a proxy for the ability of formal institutions to enforce 
contracts and prevent or sanction the occurrence of corrupt practices.  This is also a country level 
index for the year 2008, where increases in the index imply better legal quality.   
 
Including either of the indices in the model gives the following equation (4) as 
 




ijc + α3Lijc + α4Mijc + 
+ βcorruptionijc + λ(corruptionijc * institutionc) + κ institutionc + 
                                                 
15 Low and high CPI countries are defined as countries with CPI below and above the mean level, respectively. 
16 The use of perceived corruption (the CPI index by Transparency International) may be problematic if there are 
discrepancies between perceived and actual corruption. Olken (2009) shows that this may be the case by examining 
a specific case of a road building project in rural Indonesia.  He compares corruption perceived by villagers with a 
more objective measure of corruption based on missing expenditure.  While a difference between actual and 
perceived corruption may potentially be a problem, one should keep in mind that Transparency International reports 
broad country level indices which are based on expert and business surveys.   20 
 
+ γXijc + dj + dc + εijc      ( 4 )  
 
In equation (4) a significant coefficient for λ will indicate that the effect of corruption on 
productivity depends on the country’s level of institutional quality, as represented by the 
diffusion of corruption and the efficiency of the legal system.  In particular, a positive (negative) 
coefficient of λ will indicate that high institutional quality will lessen (strengthen) the negative 
effect of corruption at the firm level on productivity.   
 
 
4 Econometric Analysis 
 
We now turn to the results of econometric analysis in the three stages outlined above. Namely, 
we examine the effects of corruption on productivity; of the interaction between corruption and 
the time tax; and of the relevance of country characteristics for firm level outcomes.  
 
As discussed, the determinants of productivity are estimated using a one-step augmented 
production function.  In order to address the potential endogeneity of firm level bribe tax and 
time tax, equation (1) is estimated with an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Implementation 
of the IV method requires the utilization of adequate instruments that must fulfil two conditions, 
namely being correlated with the endogenous variable and being uncorrelated with the error term 
in equation (1).  
 
While it is difficult to find fully excludable instruments, the BEEPS data set offers a number of 
potential candidates.  For instance, firms are asked whether or not the owner is female.  There is 
evidence in the literature that women are more risk averse than men (Barsky et al., 1998).  If that 
is the case, then they may also be less likely to engage in corrupt behaviour, which can be seen 
as a risky activity.  While risk aversion may also play a role for the productivity of females, it is 
not a priori obvious that gender should have a direct influence on productivity that is not related 
to the indirect channel of risk aversion.  Also, the data relate to the owner of the firm, not the 
manager.  While the owner may have more influence on fundamental decision such as whether 
or not a firm should engage in illegal activities such as corruption, the owner may matter less for 21 
 
operational decisions that affect productivity.  Hence, we would argue that this may be a relevant 
and valid instrument for corruption.   
 
An alternative instrumental variables candidate is a firm’s reply to a question as to whether they 
submitted an application for an electricity connection over the last two years.  This allows us to 
generate a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm did not submit an application and 0 if it did.  
This variable is arguably likely to be correlated with corruption, since it would imply interaction 
with public officials who have to grant the firm its right to be connected with the electricity grid. 
This would, hence, be a good opportunity for corrupt officials to demand a payment, either in 
cash or in terms of time.  On the other hand, a dummy whether or not a firm submitted an 
application for electricity is unlikely to be correlated with productivity.  Since one may assume 
that a firm needs some access to electricity to start operating, it appears reasonable that the 
application that is mentioned in the survey must relate to an additional or new connection.  There 
is therefore no a priori reason why, conditional on the covariates in equation (1), there should be 
a correlation between the incidence of the application and TFP.  It is also important to point out 
that this variable relates to the incidence of the application, not the actual connection to 
electricity.  While this may of course lead to a new connection in the future, which may then 
possibly (but not necessarily) lead to an increase in productivity, this is unlikely to be the case in 
the current period.   
 
Furthermore, we employ two additional instruments.  These are the country-industry averages of 
bribe tax and time tax.  These instruments are also employed by Fisman and Svensson (2007).  
Firms’ experiences and perceptions of corrupt practices or of the burden in terms of time 
associated with red tape are likely to be influenced by the experiences of other competitors in the 
same industry.  Hence, we would expect our additional instruments to be correlated with the 
firm-level bribe tax and time tax variables.  The necessary assumption for the validity of the 
instruments is that there is no direct effect of the sectoral average on a firm’s level of 
productivity conditional on the included covariates.  This would not be the case if there were 
processes at the industry level that affect firm level productivity and bribes.  An example may be 
governments favouring sectors that are particularly productive (or unproductive) in their attitude 
towards corruption.  As in Fisman and Svensson (2007), we are not aware of any systematic 22 
 
evidence to support this claim.  Hence, we are cautiously confident that our instrument does not 
just pick up any unobserved industry effects that are correlated with firm level productivity.   
 
We based our selection of instruments on initial tests for the validity and relevance of the 
instruments using standard tests.  These tests indicate that the dummy whether the owner is 
female and the industry average are valid instruments in all cases.  The dummy capturing 
whether a firm applied for an electricity connection is only valid and relevant in the case of the 
bribe tax, hence, we only use it when looking at the effects of bribes on productivity.   
 
The results reported in Table 3 are, hence, based on using a female dummy, electrical connection 
application dummy, and industry level bribes, as instruments for bribe tax.  For time tax, we do 
not use the electrical connection dummy, only the female dummy and industry level time tax as 
instruments.  We report tests for the relevance of the instruments in these specifications, using a 
joint F test to verify whether the instrument candidates are correlated with the endogenous 
variable (e.g., Staiger and Stock, 1997) in Table 3. The F-statistics are higher than 20 in both 
cases confirming that the instruments are jointly highly correlated with the respective firm level 
corruption variable. Furthermore, we provide a Hansen-Sargan J test of overidentification 
restrictions to check that the IV candidates are uncorrelated with the error term in equation (1).  
The p-values of the Hansen-Sargan test confirm the validity of the chosen IV, as we cannot reject 
the null of instrument validity.  We also present the full first-stage results of the IV model in the 
appendix (Table A4). 
 
The second stage results of the effects of time and bribe taxes on productivity according to the 
baseline estimation of equation (1) are presented in Table 3.  Columns (1) and (2) present the 









Table 3 Productivity regression results: baseline specifications 
Dependent Variable: Log Output 
OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bribe  Tax  -0.031  -0.608    
   [0.069]    [0.252]**    
Time Tax    0.001    -0.009 
     [0.002]    [0.008] 
L  0.319 0.311 0.320 0.309 
    [0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.048]*** [0.048]*** 
M  0.420 0.418 0.423 0.425 
    [0.030]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]*** 
K
Equipment  0.070 0.074 0.072 0.075 
    [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.016]*** 
K
Land  0.003 0.011 -0.003 0.004 
    [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
Exporter  0.219 0.206 0.233 0.209 
    [0.050]*** [0.054]*** [0.052]*** [0.052]*** 
Age  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
SizeM  -0.440 -0.454 -0.406 -0.458 
    [0.104]*** [0.109]*** [0.113]*** [0.113]*** 
SizeL  -0.254 -0.257 -0.237 -0.242 
    [0.060]*** [0.064]*** [0.066]*** [0.066]*** 
Foreign  Owned  0.175 0.183 0.205 0.169 
   [0.067]***  [0.073]**  [0.073]***  [0.072]** 
Innovator  0.068 0.072 0.066 0.048 
    [0.054] [0.056] [0.054] [0.055] 
Competition  -0.022 -0.016 -0.009 -0.011 
    [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.017] 
Courts  -0.039 -0.065 0.048 -0.046 
    [0.052] [0.055] [0.067] [0.056] 
Political  Stability  0.056 0.037 0.071 0.024 
    [0.047] [0.048] [0.048] [0.047] 
Constant  YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Sector Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
R squared  0.86  0.87   0.79   0.80 
Wu-Hausman (p-value)      0.03   0.17 
Hansen J (p-value)      0.66   0.45 
F-Stat          43.11   27.24 
Observations  1666 1519 1629 1490 
Note: Standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Instruments: bribe tax: country-industry bribe tax, dummy for female 
owner, dummy for electricity connection application.  Time tax: country-industry time tax, dummy 
for female owner. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Note firstly that the coefficient on the production factors capital, labour, land and materials are 
all positive as expected.  Furthermore, exporters and foreign-owned firms are more productive, 
ceteris paribus, as expected.  Strikingly, larger firms tend to be less productive, perhaps a sign of 24 
 
incomplete restructuring that prevents firms from exploiting the benefits of scale economies. 
Whereas innovation would be expected to be associated with higher productivity, the innovation 
dummy appears as insignificant in all specifications. This may indicate that the innovation 
activities carried our within firms may be insufficient to have an impact on productivity. This 
result could indicate a prevalence of defensive as opposed to strategic restructuring by the firms 
in the sample, where the former is related to short-term cost-cutting measures, while the latter is 
focused on increasing the long-term efficiency and viability of the firm, by investing in labour 
training, fixed assets and other innovation related activities such as R&D (Grosfeld and Roland, 
1997; Aghion et al., 1997; Frydman et al., 1999). The other controls are statistically insignificant. 
 
Examination of the OLS results in columns 1 and 2 shows that the coefficients on both time and 
bribe tax are statistically insignificant.  It is, however, unlikely that the corruption variables are 
exogenous in this productivity estimation.  For example, highly productive firms may have a 
better ability to engage in bribing or may be preferred targets of bureaucrats aiming at exacting 
bribes.  This would introduce reverse causality in the equation or, more formally, a correlation 
between the right-hand-side variable and the error term. Another potential source of endogeneity 
is the impact of unobserved institutional characteristics at the firm level.  We argue that our 
measures of perception of the quality of courts and political instability go some way to address 
these concerns. 
 
The Wu-Hausman test is performed to check whether bribe is endogenous and the results are 
given at the bottom of Table 3. The significant p-value rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity 
of bribe tax.  This is not the case for time tax, however, where we cannot reject exogeneity.  
However, in both cases we implement an instrumental variables (IV) technique to estimate 
equation (1) to check the implications this has for the coefficient on corruption.  
 
The bribe tax has a negative and significant effect on productivity when adjusting for potential 
endogeneity bias (Table 3, column 4). The negative and significant coefficient of bribe tax 
indicates that firms that pay bribes to officials experience lower productivity than other firms.  
The size of the coefficient suggests that a firm that pays bribes is on average around 45 percent 25 
 
less productive than a non-corrupt firm.
17  The table also shows that, none of the controls for 
institutional quality are significantly correlated with firm-level productivity. We also still fail to 
find a statistically significant impact of time tax on firm level productivity (Column 3). 
 
4.1 Trade-offs between the Bribe Tax and the Time Tax 
 
The preceding analysis has shown that corruption proper and inefficient bureaucracy have 
differentiated effects on firm level productivity in our sample. Namely, while the payment of 
bribes is negatively associated with the productivity of the bribing firm, time spent dealing with 
bureaucratic requirements per se appears to be irrelevant. However, it has been argued that the 
occurrence of corruption may not be independent of the length of bureaucratic processes. These 
may, in fact, be deliberately established by state officials with the intent of exacting bribes. In 
this context, the payment of bribes might help “grease the wheels of commerce” by speeding up 
bureaucratic requirements, as captured by the time tax, and lead to a second best outcome for the 
bribing firm. The challenge is, therefore, to examine whether the (negative) effect of bribes on 
productivity is somehow dependent on the time that firms have to spend dealing with red tape.  
 
In particular, we could find evidence of “efficient grease” if the time tax mitigated the negative 
impact of bribes. This could be the case if bribe payments were used to buy lower effective red 
tape thus reducing the inefficiencies associated with the time firms have to spend with 
bureaucrats. On the contrary, if bureaucrats intentionally targeted more productive firms, as in 









                                                 
17 Calculated as exp(-0.608)-1 26 
 
Table 4 Trade-off between the bribe tax and the time tax  
Dependent Variable: Log Output 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS IV OLS IV 
Bribe  tax  0.019 -0.509 0.021 -1.151 
   [0.075]  [0.261]*  [0.099]  [0.859] 
Time  tax  0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 
    [0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.008] 
Time tax * Bribe tax      -0.000  0.050 
       [0.004]  [0.062] 
L  0.311 0.314 0.311 0.306 
    [0.046]*** [0.050]*** [0.046]*** [0.049]*** 
M  0.418 0.422 0.418 0.421 
    [0.031]*** [0.032]*** [0.031]*** [0.032]*** 
K
Equipment  0.074 0.076 0.074 0.084 
    [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.021]*** 
K
Land  0.011 0.002 0.011 0.003 
    [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.015] 
Exporter  0.206 0.226 0.206 0.237 
    [0.054]*** [0.055]*** [0.053]*** [0.062]*** 
Age  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
SizeM  -0.455 -0.432 -0.455 -0.440 
    [0.109]*** [0.121]*** [0.109]*** [0.123]*** 
SizeL  -0.257 -0.235 -0.257 -0.230 
    [0.064]*** [0.071]*** [0.065]*** [0.076]*** 
Foreign  Owned  0.181 0.203 0.181 0.166 
   [0.073]**  [0.078]***  [0.073]**  [0.093]* 
Innovator  0.072 0.053 0.072 0.056 
    [0.056] [0.055] [0.056] [0.058] 
Competition -0.016  0.000  -0.016  -0.004 
    [0.015] [0.018] [0.015] [0.018] 
Courts -0.067  0.026  -0.067  -0.001 
    [0.055] [0.073] [0.055] [0.087] 
Political  Stability  0.036 0.047 0.037 0.021 
    [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.059] 
Constant  YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Sector Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
R squared  0.87   0.80  0.87   0.78 
Wu-Hausman [p-value]    0.06     0.10 
Hansen J [p-value]    0.78     0.90 
F-Stat [time tax]    11.14     11.14 
F-Stat [bribe tax]    29.25     29.25 
F-Stat [time tax * bribe tax]            6.83 
Observations  1519 1490 1519 1490 
Note: Standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Note: Instruments used in column (2) are the same as in Table 4.  In column (4), we include the interaction 
of industry level bribe tax and industry level time tax as additional instrument in order to be able to test 




A direct way to investigate the trade-offs between bribes and red tape and to test whether such 
trade-offs are of the “efficient grease” type, is to include the bribe tax and the time tax jointly in 
the empirical specification, together with their interaction. Examination of the sign, significance 
and magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term would allow drawing conclusions on the 
nature of the relationships between bribe payments and red tape in our sample and to verify the 
extent to which the effect of corruption on productivity is conditional on time consuming 
dealings with bureaucracy.  
 
Table 4 shows that the interaction of time tax and bribe tax is insignificant, failing to provide 
evidence of a link between inefficient bureaucracy, corruption and productivity. The time tax 
remains statistically insignificant, whereas the effect of the bribe tax for productivity remains 
negative but becomes statistically insignificant when including the interaction term. This 
suggests that the specification with the interaction term does not fit the data well.  The 
coefficient for factor inputs and other control variables remain largely unaltered compared to 
Table 3. 
 
4.2 Does the Institutional Environment Matter? 
 
An interesting question that can be answered with our data is whether there are any systematic 
variations in the effects of corruption on productivity across groups of countries.  More 
specifically, we investigate whether there are any differences across countries that entered the 
EU recently and those that are not members, as well as among countries with various levels of 










Table 5 Productivity regression results: EU vs. Non-EU countries 
Dependent Variable: Log Output 
OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bribe tax  -0.055     -0.710    
   [0.072]    [0.283]**    
Bribe tax * EU  0.227    0.868    
   [0.258]    [0.342]**    
Time tax   0.001  -0.014 
     [0.002]    [0.012] 
Time tax * EU   -0.001  0.014 
    [0.003]  [0.012] 
EU Country  -0.334 -0.317 -0.484 -0.717 
   [0.250] [0.274]  [0.184]***  [0.279]** 
L  0.321 0.311 0.327 0.310 
    [0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.049]*** [0.048]*** 
M  0.419 0.418 0.421 0.428 
    [0.030]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.032]*** 
K
Equipment  0.071 0.074 0.077 0.075 
    [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.016]*** 
K
Land 0.002  0.011  -0.008  0.003 
    [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
Exporter  0.218 0.207 0.229 0.206 
    [0.051]*** [0.054]*** [0.052]*** [0.051]*** 
Age  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
SizeM  -0.435 -0.454 -0.386 -0.453 
    [0.104]*** [0.109]*** [0.115]*** [0.112]*** 
SizeL  -0.251 -0.257 -0.223 -0.250 
    [0.061]*** [0.065]*** [0.067]*** [0.068]*** 
Foreign  Owned  0.175 0.183 0.206 0.164 
   [0.067]***  [0.073]**  [0.074]***  [0.072]** 
Innovator  0.068 0.072 0.066 0.047 
    [0.054] [0.056] [0.053] [0.056] 
Competition  -0.022 -0.016 -0.008 -0.013 
    [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] 
Courts -0.041  -0.065  0.043  -0.047 
    [0.052] [0.055] [0.066] [0.058] 
Political  Stability  0.056 0.037 0.074 0.027 
    [0.047] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048] 
Constant  YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Sector Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
R squared  0.86  0.87   0.80   0.80 
Wu-Hausman [p-value]      0.03   0.17 
Hansen J [p-value]      0.62   0.43 
F-Stat         32.02  14.22 
Observations  1666 1519 1629 1490 
Note: Standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets.       * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Instruments: XYZ; country-industry time tax; country-industry bribe tax. 
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As a first step, we interact the bribe and the time tax with EU membership (Table 5). First, we 
observe that the sign and significance of controls remains unchanged with respect to Table 4. 
Second, it emerges that the time tax remains insignificant, also when interacted with the EU 
dummy, whereas the bribe tax remains significant with a negative sign in isolation, while 
displaying a large, positive and significant effect in the interaction (columns 3 and 4). This 
indicates that bribe payments do not have a negative impact on productivity in EU countries – 
the effect may even be positive. 
 
The finding that the bribe tax is less harmful in EU countries may reflect the generally higher 
institutional quality in countries with higher incomes per capita.
18  The negative effect of the 
bribe tax on productivity in non-EU countries may be linked to generally poorer institutional 
quality and to the fact that, in high corruption environments, bribing could be regarded as the 
norm for most interactions with the State.  Bribery will hence constitute a drag on productivity, 
without enabling firms to reap an efficiency advantage over competitors, as it is very likely that 
other firms are also paying bribes.   
 
In order to examine the possibility of country-specific effects a step further, we explicitly 
consider the potential influence of broader institutional characteristics of the country. For this 
purpose, two variables, obtained from sources other than the BEEPS, are used. The first is the 
Corruption Perception Index computed by Transparency International.  The second is a measure 
of the quality of the legal framework taken from the Global Competitiveness Report.  As shown 
in Table A3 in the Appendix, mirroring the large differences in income per capita, these two 
variables also present substantial variation across the countries in the sample.  We, therefore, 
posit that the effect of bribe and time tax on productivity may depend on the overall prevalence 
of corruption in the country - in the spirit of theories highlighting the role of social effects on 
individual behaviour – and on the effectiveness of the legal framework in preventing and 
sanctioning corrupt behaviour. This hypothesis is tested by estimating model (4) and the results 
are given in Tables 6 and 7.   
                                                 
18 One may also try to detect a specific effect of EU accession, implying that the requirements of EU accession may 
induce countries to improve the process of formulation and enforcement of laws and regulations, thus reducing the 
occurrence of bribes as experienced by firms.  However, such a conclusion would require a more detailed analysis, 
which takes account of the time series dimension to model pre- and post-accession environments and controls for 
observed and unobserved country characteristics. 30 
 
Table 6 Productivity regression results: Country-level corruption 
Dependent Variable: Log Output 
OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bribe tax  0.149     -4.105    
   [0.199]    [2.364]*    
Bribe tax * CPI  -0.069    1.372    
   [0.067]    [0.823]*    
Time tax   0.001  0.005 
     [0.005]  [0.064] 
Time tax * CPI   0.000  -0.001 
    [0.001]  [0.017] 
cpi_2008  -0.120 -0.105 -0.745 -0.338 
   [0.061]* [0.062]*  [0.377]** [0.318] 
L  0.318 0.311 0.342 0.307 
    [0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.067]*** [0.047]*** 
M  0.420 0.418 0.436 0.422 
    [0.030]*** [0.031]*** [0.038]*** [0.033]*** 
K
Equipment  0.069 0.074 0.098 0.074 
    [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.028]*** [0.017]*** 
K
Land 0.004  0.011  -0.033  0.009 
    [0.013] [0.013] [0.026] [0.015] 
Exporter  0.218 0.206 0.287 0.205 
    [0.050]*** [0.053]*** [0.084]*** [0.057]*** 
Age  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
    [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
SizeM  -0.445 -0.454 -0.230 -0.449 
   [0.104]***  [0.109]***  [0.167]  [0.110]*** 
SizeL  -0.258 -0.257 -0.127 -0.245 
   [0.060]***  [0.065]***  [0.105]  [0.065]*** 
Foreign  Owned  0.176 0.183 0.275 0.171 
    [0.067]*** [0.073]** [0.091]*** [0.077]** 
Innovator  0.070 0.072 0.040 0.060 
    [0.054] [0.056] [0.059] [0.060] 
Competition  -0.022 -0.016 -0.019 -0.019 
    [0.015] [0.015] [0.022] [0.018] 
Courts -0.040  -0.065  0.098  -0.055 
    [0.052] [0.055] [0.100] [0.057] 
Political  Stability  0.057 0.037 0.063 0.024 
    [0.047] [0.049] [0.057] [0.047] 
Constant  YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Sector Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
R squared  0.86  0.87   0.74   0.81 
Wu-Hausman [p-value]      0.07   0.97 
Hansen J [p-value]      0.67   0.94 
F-Stat         2.04  3.45  
Observations  1666 1519 1252 1490 
Note: Standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets.       * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. Instruments: XYZ; country-industry time tax; country-industry bribe tax. 31 
 
Table 7 Productivity regression results: Quality of the legal framework 
Dependent Variable: Log Output 
OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bribe tax  -0.432     -19.284    
   [0.432]    [10.369]*    
Bribe tax * LF  0.126    6.435    
   [0.148]    [3.566]*    
Time tax   -0.001  -0.087 
     [0.008]    [0.190] 
Time tax * LF   0.001  0.030 
    [0.003]  [0.064] 
Legal framework  0.346 0.346 -1.517  -0.836 
   [0.105]*** [0.117]***  [1.894]  [1.185] 
L  0.300 0.289 0.320 0.269 
    [0.049]*** [0.050]*** [0.059]*** [0.061]*** 
M  0.423 0.421 0.401 0.450 
    [0.033]*** [0.035]*** [0.044]*** [0.040]*** 
K
Equipment  0.069 0.075 0.089 0.078 
    [0.017]*** [0.018]*** [0.027]*** [0.024]*** 
K
Land 0.002  0.010  -0.002  0.004 
    [0.014] [0.015] [0.017] [0.017] 
Exporter  0.230 0.215 0.135 0.223 
    [0.053]***  [0.057]*** [0.086] [0.075]*** 
Age -0.000  -0.000  0.001  -0.001 
    [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
SizeM  -0.487 -0.506 -0.397 -0.425 
    [0.106]*** [0.110]*** [0.146]*** [0.159]*** 
SizeL  -0.270 -0.276 -0.240 -0.224 
   [0.061]***  [0.065]***  [0.098]**  [0.093]** 
Foreign  Owned  0.209 0.212 0.373 0.327 
    [0.071]*** [0.078]*** [0.137]*** [0.087]*** 
Innovator  0.069 0.073 0.080 0.082 
    [0.055] [0.058] [0.072] [0.075] 
Competition  -0.024 -0.020 -0.001 -0.033 
    [0.015] [0.015] [0.026]  [0.019]* 
Courts -0.018  -0.047  0.045  -0.001 
    [0.050] [0.052] [0.083] [0.066] 
Political  Stability  0.063 0.038 0.097 0.032 
    [0.049] [0.051] [0.069] [0.062] 
Constant  YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Sector Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
R squared  0.87  0.87   0.59   0.81 
Wu-Hausman [p-value]      0.00   0.63 
Hansen J [p-value]      0.91   0.79 
F-Stat         2.51  2.75  
Observations  1504 1363 1470  981 
Note: Standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets.       * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Instruments: XYZ; country-industry time tax; country-industry bribe tax. 
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Overall, our results indicate that the relationship between corruption and economic performance 
is conditional on the overall level of institutional quality. In particular, the coefficients on time 
tax and its interaction are statistically insignificant, the coefficient of bribe tax is still negative 
and significant in all specifications, whereas the interactive term, bribe×institution, is positive 
and significant for both the CPI and the quality of the legal framework.   
 
In order to illustrate the role of country features, and specifically the level of corruption in the 
country as represented by the CPI, we can use the estimated coefficients of column 3 in Table 6 
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Equation (6) demonstrates that in highly corrupt environments – i.e. for lower values of the CPI - 
bribes have higher negative impact on productivity. At the same time, as the value of the CPI 
increases (less corrupt environments), the total effect of bribe on productivity becomes less 
negative and, beyond a certain threshold, could even be positive. This could be because, in an 
environment that is generally free of corruption, paying a bribe might result in a competitive 
advantage, perhaps reflected in a marginal gain in firm level productivity. On the other hand, in a 
highly corrupt environment, social effects of the type modelled by Andvig and Moene (1990) or 
Tirole (1996) may induce most market players to pay a bribe. Hence there would be no 
competitive edge or gain in productivity to be obtained by paying a bribe. Quite the opposite, 
paying more bribes allocates resources away from their most productive use, reducing 
productivity of the firm.  Hence productivity gains are more likely to incur to the firms that do 
not bear the cost of bribes. 
 
From these results we can calculate that the cut-off point at which the sign of the total effect 
changes is 2.99.
19 Table 8 shows the countries in the sample for which the total effect of 
corruption on productivity is positive and negative. Interestingly, based on the CPI, the total 
                                                 
19 Here we are of course assuming that the relationship is linear and there is only one cut-off point.   33 
 
effect of corruption is negative in all former Soviet republics, with the exception of the Baltics 
and Georgia.    
Table 8 Effects of corruption and legal quality on productivity  
Negative   Positive   Negative   Positive  
(CPI < 2.99)  (CPI > 2.99)  (legal quality < 2.99)  (legal quality > 2.99) 
Armenia   Albania   Armenia Albania 
Azerbaijan   Bosnia   Bosnia Azerbaijan 
Belarus   Bulgaria   Bulgaria Belarus 
Kazakhstan   Croatia   Croatia  Czech Republic 
Kyrgyz   Czech Republic  Kyrgyz  Estonia 
Moldova   Estonia   Poland  FYROM 
Russia   FYROM   Romania  Georgia 
Tajikistan   Georgia   Russia Hungary 
Ukraine   Hungary  Serbia Kazakhstan 
Uzbekistan   Latvia   Ukraine Latvia 
   Lithuania     Lithuania 
   Montenegro    Moldova 
   Poland     Montenegro 
   Romania     Slovakia 
   Serbia     Slovenia 
   Slovakia    Tajikistan 
   Slovenia    Uzbekistan
 
We can make similar calculations for the alternative measure of institutional quality, the 
efficiency of the legal framework in sanctioning corrupt behaviour in column (3) of Table 7, 
where the total effect of bribes is -19.284 + 6.435*legal_quality.  While the overlap of countries 
with negative and positive effects of firm level bribes is not complete, there are a number of 
countries that are in the same categories when using the two alternative indices.  These are 
marked in bold in the table.   
 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Corruption is often identified as one of the primary causes for the underdevelopment of many 
economies. Nevertheless, some see corruption as a necessary evil that, by “greasing the wheels 
of commerce”, mitigates the negative effects of inefficient bureaucracy, which may be seen as 
imposing a “time tax” on individuals and firms. At the same time, both the incentives for - and 
the impact of - corruption may be different across countries, depending on the nature of the 34 
 
surrounding environment, namely on the diffusion of corruption and on the ability of the legal 
system to sanction corrupt behaviour. 
 
Based on these premises, this study investigates the effect of corruption - interpreted as a “bribe 
tax” - on firm-level productivity across a diverse sample of countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union. The findings of econometric analysis corroborate the 
hypothesis that corruption has, on balance, negative consequences for enterprise performance. 
However, the relationship between corruption and economic performance presents some 
nuances. 
 
First, a comparison of the effects of the bribe tax and the time tax indicates that only bribery 
negatively affects firm productivity, while lengthy bureaucratic requirements per se have no 
significant consequences.  
 
Second, an explicit test of the hypothesis that bribes help to mitigate the negative effects of time 
consuming dealings with bureaucracy does not find confirmation in our data. Contrary to 
previous studies addressing the same question at the country level, our conclusion is based on a 
precise definition of the institutional inefficiencies that corruption is supposed to “grease” –
namely lengthy bureaucratic requirements – rather than generic measures of “governance”. 
 
Third, broader environmental circumstances turn out to play a significant role in determining the 
impact of firm level corruption on productivity. In fact, results indicate that the effects on firm 
productivity are different in EU and non-EU countries, with the bribe tax appearing more 
harmful in non-EU countries. Further consideration of country-wide measures leads to the 
conclusion that, in highly corrupt environments and where the legal framework is weaker, firms 
that do not pay bribes are more productive. Furthermore, as the level of institutional quality 
decreases, the total effect of corruption is increasingly negative. This suggests that, whereas 
environmental circumstances are beyond the choice set of individual firms, managers retain 
some degree of autonomy in deciding whether to recur to bribery or not and this affects 
enterprise performance.  
 35 
 
A possible policy implication of these findings is that narrow measures to reduce the incentives 
for corruption, such as targeted wage increases for public officials, are likely to be ineffective if 
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Table A.1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
TFP  Total factor productivity, calculated as residual from a production function 
Y  This establishment’s total annual sales 
K  This establishment spend on purchases of machinery, land and building 
L  Total annual cost of labour (including wages, salaries, bonuses, social security payments) 
M  Total annual cost of raw materials and intermediate goods used in production 
Time Tax 
 
Percentage of time spent by senior management with public officials in order to obtain 
favourable interpretation of regulations 
Bribe Tax  Dummy = 1 if firm replies frequently, usually or always to the question “it is common to 
have to pay some irregular additional payment or gifts to get things done”. 
Courts  Dummy = 1 if firm replies that courts are a major obstacle or very severe obstacle to the 
operations of the firm 
Political stability  Dummy = 1 if firm replies that political instability is a major obstacle or very severe 
obstacle to the operations of the firm 
CPI  Corruption Perception Index at the country level. It relates to perceptions of the degree of 
corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly 
clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
Legal  Framework  Indicator from the Global Competitiveness Report at the country level. It provides a 
measure  of the efficiency of the legal framework in settling disputes (1 = extremely 
inefficient; 7 = highly efficient). 
Exporter  Dummy = 1 if firm has positive exports 
Foreign_Owned  Dummy = 1 if firm has foreign ownership 
Innovator  Dummy = 1 if firm has positive expenditure on R&D 
Age  Age of firm (years) 
SizeS  Dummy = 1 for small firm (less than 20 employees) 
SizeM  Dummy = 1 for medium firm (between 20 and 99 employees) 
SizeL  Dummy = 1 for large firm (larger than 99 employees) 
Competition  Difference between firm’s perception and country level average on question “competition 






Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of variables used  
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
TFP 1666  0.22  0.90 
Time tax  1519  12.81  14.79 
Bribe Tax  1666  0.11  0.31 
Courts 1666  0.19  0.39 
Political stability  1666  0.32  0.46 
CPI 1666  3.57  1.29 
Legal Framework  1504  2.98  0.51 
Exporter 1666  0.49  0.50 
Foreign_Owned 1666  0.11  0.30 
Innovator 1666  0.21  0.41 
Age 1666  20.34  20.33 
SizeM 1666  0.29  0.45 
SizeL 1666  0.37  0.48 




Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of variables used by country  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Albania 0.85 0.95 0.03 0.17 20.38 22.56 3.40 0.00 3.60 0.00
Belarus 0.12 0.83 0.09 0.29 19.00 20.20 2.00 0.00
Georgia 0.22 0.89 0.03 0.18 2.00 6.84 3.90 0.00 3.20 0.00
Tajikistan 0.36 0.87 0.13 0.33 14.98 19.19 2.00 0.00 3.40 0.00
Ukraine 0.25 1.11 0.21 0.41 15.01 21.93 2.50 0.00 2.30 0.00
Uzbekistan 0.42 1.04 0.36 0.48 12.77 13.84 1.80 0.00
Russia 0.02 0.83 0.23 0.42 20.17 25.66 2.10 0.00 2.90 0.00
Poland -0.01 0.84 0.04 0.21 14.14 13.77 4.60 0.00 2.80 0.00
Romania 0.19 0.92 0.18 0.38 13.50 17.95 3.80 0.00 2.90 0.00
Serbia -0.06 0.92 0.10 0.30 17.24 18.62 3.40 0.00 2.60 0.00
Kazakhstan 0.08 0.79 0.20 0.40 6.11 11.12 2.20 0.00 3.40 0.00
Moldova 0.47 0.96 0.09 0.29 10.49 17.24 2.90 0.00
Bosnia -0.21 0.69 0.09 0.29 14.02 17.63 3.20 0.00 1.80 0.00
Azerbaijan 0.03 0.64 0.21 0.41 2.66 4.95 1.90 0.00 3.80 0.00
FYROM 0.20 0.65 0.08 0.27 14.80 15.36 3.60 0.00 3.20 0.00
Armenia 0.38 0.97 0.08 0.27 13.95 16.90 2.90 0.00 2.80 0.00
Kyrgyz 0.86 1.46 0.19 0.40 4.03 8.03 1.80 0.00 2.60 0.00
Estonia 0.02 0.87 0.02 0.15 8.32 10.74 6.60 0.00 4.20 0.00
Czech Rep 0.85 1.77 0.03 0.18 13.46 14.67 5.20 0.00 3.40 0.00
Hungary 0.28 0.91 0.03 0.18 18.64 18.71 5.10 0.00 3.10 0.00
Latvia -0.10 0.70 0.02 0.15 8.74 12.88 5.00 0.00 3.10 0.00
Lithuania 0.05 0.65 0.00 0.00 10.37 12.16 4.60 0.00 3.50 0.00
Slovakia -0.04 0.74 0.07 0.26 7.38 12.44 5.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
Slovenia -0.25 0.74 0.01 0.10 9.21 9.26 6.70 0.00 4.00 0.00
Bulgaria 0.20 0.61 0.01 0.07 17.23 15.20 3.60 0.00 2.80 0.00
Croatia -0.19 0.73 0.00 0.06 13.17 15.67 4.40 0.00 2.60 0.00
Montenegro 0.28 1.12 0.03 0.16 9.85 11.33 3.40 0.00 3.90 0.00





Table A4: First Stage IV regressions 



























Political Stability 0.039 0.095
[0.018]** [0.926]
Industry level bribe tax 1.019
[0.079]***
Industry level time tax 0.593
[0.085]***
Female dummy -0.079 1.357
[0.045]* 0.739*
Female dummy * electricity connection application dummy 0.042
[0.024]*
Electricity Connection Application dummy -0.082
[0.047]
Constant YES YES
Country Dummies YES YES
Sector Dummies YES YES
F-Stat 43.11 27.24
Partial R Squared 0.08 0.02
Observations 1629 1666
Note: Standard errors clustered by country-industry in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  